A diferencia de todos los demás sistemas de imputación, Jakobs ubica el acento de la relevancia jurídico-penal del hecho en su significado normativo, como algo que trasciende la mera causalidad exterior y la finalidad del autor, de manera que lo decisivo para la imputación jurídico-penal no es ni lo psíquicoreal querido por el autor, ni la causalidad desplegada por su conducta, sino el significado normativo de esa conducta como la expresión de un sentido objetivo de desautorización de la vigencia de (...) la norma en un determinado contexto social. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo apresentar e discutir a sugestão de Fred Dretske para analisar o problema dos qualia. Tal problema, caro à Filosofia da Mente, ficou conhecido pela discussão desenvolvida por Thomas Nagel em seu clássico artigo What is it like to be a bat. Nesse artigo, Nagel postulou a impossibilidade de se conhecer, em perspectiva de terceira-pessoa, os aspectos da experiência humana. Ele considera que, mesmo após as descrições objetivas da experiência de um sujeito, escapariam ainda aspectos (...) qualitativos, fundamentais para se caracterizar os qualia. A partir de sua Tese Representacionista da mente, Dretske argumenta que seria possível dissolver esse problema se admitirmos que a mente é a face representacional do cérebro, a natureza dos qualia seria, assim, representacional. Nesse contexto, os fatos mentais relacionados às experiências seriam fatos representacionais: se conhecermos a natureza desses fatos representacionais conheceremos também a experiência do sistema que a representa. Diante de tal entendimento, discutimos em que medida a proposta dretskeana constitui uma alternativa ao problema dos qualia. (shrink)

El ensayo expone críticamente la fundamentación ontológica de la ética en Antonio Rosmini. Al mismo tiempo, propone una solución al problema de Hume sobre la deducción de proposiciones normativas a partir de las descriptivas. Rosmini parte del análisis del conocimiento. Desde aquí consigue acreditar el paso del pensamiento al ser, distinguiendo tres modos: ser real, ideal y moral. El filósofo identifica el tercero con una estructura agradable en todo lo naturalmente existente. Catalogar esta dimensión ontológica le permite definir el (...) bien universal como el orden amable del ser, y así conectar modernamente con la filosofía antigua. Mediante la contemplación del bien intrínseco de todo ente natural, del orden particular de su esencia, Rosmini puede validar también el salto del ser al deber ser. En efecto, pues del bien propio de cada realidad se desprende una necesidad objetiva, que a su vez aterriza en la constitución intelectiva y volitiva de la persona como necesidad subjetiva. El bien moral consistirá precisamente en el reconocimiento del sujeto de ese bien necesario. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende contribuir a superar un debate improductivo de posturas dogmáticas en torno a las modernas antropotécnicas. Con este fin, sugiere una fundamentación de la naturaleza humana como referencia normativa. Lo hace respaldándose en las diversas aportaciones de antropología filosófica, especialmente las de Antonio Rosmini y Edith Stein. Inicialmente, aborda el significado general de naturaleza, vinculándolo con las nociones de especie y esencia. Seguidamente, delinea los rasgos principales de la naturaleza humana desde un enfoque observacional y sinóptico. Desde (...) aquí, deduce tres criterios regulativos para el humanismo: valor absoluto de la persona, identidad básica del sujeto humano y perfección inherente a cada individuo. La descripción resultante funcionaría como piedra de toque para el proyecto transhumanista. En la última parte del trabajo, se subrayan algunas contradicciones ontológicas y prácticas en el intento materialista de mejorar al ser humano sin respetar los criterios mencionados. (shrink)

Caro leitor! Em busca de sempre mais apresentar reflexões consistentes e relevantes para o pensar teológico, em conexão com o mundo e às urgências da Igreja, a presente edição trás importantes temas que ajudam refletir a realidade humana à luz do mistério de Deus. Por isso, os artigos oferecidos nas mais variadas áreas, a saber: bíblico-teológica, dogmática, moral, pastoral, antropologia teológica, filosofia e eclesiologia, dão suporte científico e metodológico para a reflexão teológica. Antes de conferir as novidades desta edição, (...) gostaria de comunicar que esta Revista Eletrônica conquistou um espaço ainda maior de publicação, ao tornar-se indexada na base de dados do Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ). (shrink)

Paul Feyerabend, entre os anos de 1948 e 1970, discutiu diversas questões concernentes à mecânica quântica: problema da medição, a complementaridade e o “corte” entre o regime macro e micro, foram alguns dos assuntos mais estudados. Desde seus primeiros trabalhos acadêmicos, é possível identificar aspectos que o serão caros durante toda sua vida, como é o caso da relação entre conhecimento físico e visões de mundo. A partir de uma reconstrução de seu pensamento (entre os anos de 1948 e 1970), (...) o presente artigo busca compreender como suas críticas à mecânica quântica o levaram a defender que a física clássica é mais fundamental que a mecânica quântica, não o contrário, além de discutir a relação entre conhecimento físico e visão de mundo, algo que, para Feyerabend, é indissociável. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, we (...) will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

Normativity concerns what we ought to think or do and the evaluations we make. For example, we say that we ought to think consistently, we ought to keep our promises, or that Mozart is a better composer than Salieri. Yet what philosophical moral can we draw from the apparent absence of normativity in the scientific image of the world? For scientific naturalists, the moral is that the normative must be reduced to the nonnormative, while for nonnaturalists, the moral is that (...) there must be a transcendent realm of norms. _Naturalism and Normativity_ engages with both sides of this debate. Essays explore philosophical options for understanding normativity in the space between scientific naturalism and Platonic supernaturalism. They articulate a liberal conception of philosophy that is neither reducible to the sciences nor completely independent of them—yet one that maintains the right to call itself naturalism. Contributors think in new ways about the relations among the scientific worldview, our experience of norms and values, and our movements in the space of reason. Detailed discussions include the relationship between philosophy and science, physicalism and ontological pluralism, the realm of the ordinary, objectivity and subjectivity, truth and justification, and the liberal naturalisms of Donald Davidson, John Dewey, John McDowell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Today most philosophers in the English-speaking world adhere to “naturalist” credos that philosophy is continuous with science, and that the natural sciences provide a complete account of all that exists. This volume presents a group of leading thinkers who criticize scientific naturalism in order to defend a more inclusive or liberal naturalism.

Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021 ) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021 ). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an improved version of a view of practical wisdom, the “Aretai model”, that we have presented elsewhere (De Caro et al. 2021 ; Vaccarezza et al. 2023 ; De Caro et al. forthcoming ). According to this (...) model, practical wisdom is conceptualized: (i) as virtuousness _tout court_, i.e., as the _ratio essendi_ of the virtues, and (ii) as a form of ethical expertise. By appealing to the first thesis, we counter the charge of psychological implausibility, while we rely on the second thesis to address the accusation of redundancy. In conclusion we argue that the Aretai model implies a significant paradigm shift in virtue ethics. Practical wisdom emerges as both necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, thereby downsizing – without eliminating entirely – the role that individual virtues play in our ethical lives. (shrink)

This volume presents a group of leading thinkers who criticize scientific naturalism not in the name of some form of supernaturalism, but in order to defend a ...

This is the first collection to present a comprehensive overview of liberal naturalism. Essential reading for students and researchers in all areas of philosophy it will be of particular interest for those studying philosophical naturalism, philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and ethics.

The aim of this paper is to propose a theory of pluralistic realism, i.e. a theory that presents an idea of reality that embraces multiplicity both at an ontological and epistemological level. The basic ideal of this theory is that reality is inexhaustibly multifaceted and that, therefore, the ways in which human beings can account for it are diverse and multiple. This idea of reality also implies an idea of plural truth, i.e. as an openness and acceptance of diversity and (...) difference which can act as an antidote to the resurgence of fundamentalisms and totalitarian visions of reality based on the refusal of diversity, on the lack of ethical recognition-political-social difference and on the tendency to believe that one’s own reality and therefore one’s culture, one’s nation, one’s country are objectively superior to other realities, nations, countries, cultures. In proposing the reasons for this theory we will try to integrate Mario De Caro’s philosophical proposal of a «liberalized naturalism» or «pluralistic realism» with the phenomenological perspective of Vincenzo Costa based on the idea that reality is determined on the basis of the experience of the human subject. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the relevance of quantum mechanics to the free-will debate has been discussed at length, especially in relation to the prospects of libertarianism. Basing his interpretation on Anscombe’s seminal work, Putnam argued in 1979 that, given that quantum mechanical indeterminacy is holistic at the macrolevel—i.e., it is not traceable to atomistic events such as quantum jumps of single atoms—it can provide libertarians with the kind of freedom they seek. As shown in this article, however, Putnam ultimately (...) reached the conclusion—together with the other author of this article—that his argument was wrong due to problems with the way it appealed to the Uncertainty Principle.**. (shrink)

The recent discussions on the unity of virtue suffer from a lack of reference to the processes through which we interpret each other as moral agents. In the present paper it is argued that much light can be thrown on that crucial issue by appealing to a version of Donald Davidson’s Principle of Charity, which we call “Principle of Phronetic Charity”. The idea is that in order to treat somebody as a moral agent, one has first to attribute to them, (...) at least pro tempore, a significant degree of practical wisdom and, then, to assess and rationally adjust such attribution of competence via actual engagement with them – a process that may lead to different responses on the part of the interpreter. After expounding and defending the Principle of Phronetic Charity and the interpretive practices connected with it, we discuss the repercussions of our account on the issue of the epistemic access to virtue. We will show, in particular, that some important components of both disunitarianism and unitarianism have to be retained: in accordance with the former, we stress the role of concrete experience over pure speculation and, up to a point, the idea that virtues tend to form variegated ensembles; in accordance with the latter, we accept the claim that virtues are not attributed to moral agents in isolation. Ultimately, however, the account developed here rejects both the atomism of the disunitarian view and the holism of the “Unity of the Virtues”, since it is in fact a form of molecularism, according to which virtues come neither individually nor as a whole, but rather as clusters. (shrink)

Scientific naturalism—the conception according to which the natural sciences, and possibly physics alone, set the limits of ontology and epistemology—is characterized by a strong monistic tendency. For this reason, all versions of scientific naturalism face the so-called “placement problem”, which concerns the features of the ordinary view of the world that, at least prima facie, do not fit into the scientific view of the world (think of consciousness, moral properties, free will, and intentionality). To address this problem, scientific naturalists use (...) three strategies: reductionism, eliminativism, and mysterianism—none of which, it is argued, produces satisfying results. Liberal naturalism opts instead for a pluralistic attitude in both ontology and epistemology but accepts a constraint according to which one should accept no entity or explanation that is incompatible with the scientific worldview. Liberal naturalism faces the “reconciliation problem”, which concerns the relationship between the scientific and the ordinary views of the world once one denies ontological and epistemological priority to either of them. Three strategies for addressing this problem are presented: according to the first, the ordinary worldview and the scientific world are categorically distinct; according to the second, the former emerges from the latter; according to the third, between them there is a relation of global supervenience. Other objections to liberal naturalism are finally presented and addressed. (shrink)

The article discusses the origin of the split between common sense and the scientific view of the world, which took lace at the beginning of the modern age. More specifically, it shows how Galileo...

It is very contentious whether the features of the manifest image have a place in the world as it is described by natural science. For the advocates of strict naturalism, this is a serious problem, which has been labelled ‘placement problem’. In this light, some of them try to show that those features are reducible to scientifically acceptable ones. Others, instead, argue that the features of the manifest image are mere illusions and, consequently, have to be eliminated from our ontology. (...) In brief, the two options that are open to strict naturalists for solving the placement problem are ontological reductionism and eliminativism. Other advocates of naturalist philosophy, however, claim that both these strategies fail and, consequently, opt for ‘mysterianism’, the view according to which we cannot give up the recalcitrant features of the manifest image even if we are not able to understand the ways in which they could be reduced to the scientific features. Mysterianism has the merit of facing the difficulties that whoever wants to explain reductively, or explain away, the features of the manifest image encounters. It is also a defeatist philosophical view, though, since it considers the most important philosophical problems as unsolvable mysteries. For this reason, I argue that mysterianism can also be taken as a reductio of strict naturalism, given its presumption that all phenomena are either explainable by the natural sciences or to be rejected as illusory. In this article, it is argued that the failures of reductionism, eliminativism and mysterianism should teach us that both the scientific image and the manifest image of the world are essential and mutually irreducible but not incompatible with each other. To support this claim, in the second part of the article, the case of free will is discussed. (shrink)

Feasting on a plethora of social media platforms, news aggregators, and online marketplaces, recommender systems (RSs) are spreading pervasively throughout our daily online activities. Over the years, a host of ethical issues have been associated with the diffusion of RSs and the tracking and monitoring of users’ data. Here, we focus on the impact RSs may have on personal autonomy as the most elusive among the often-cited sources of grievance and public outcry. On the grounds of a philosophically nuanced notion (...) of autonomy, we illustrate three specific reasons why RSs may limit or compromise it: the threat of manipulation and deception associated with RSs; the RSs’ power to reshape users’ personal identity; the impact of RSs on knowledge and critical thinking. In our view, however, notwithstanding these legitimate concerns, RSs may effectively help users to navigate an otherwise overwhelming landscape. Our perspective, therefore, is not to be intended as a bulwark to protect the _status quo_ but as an invitation to carefully weigh these aspects in the design of ethically oriented RSs. (shrink)

The critical concern of the present volume is contemporary naturalism, both in its scientific version and as represented by newly emerging hopes for another, philosophically more liberal, naturalism.1 The papers collected here are state-of-the-art discussions that question the appeal, rational motivations, and presuppositions of scientific naturalism across a broad range of philosophical topics. As an alternative to scientific naturalism, we offer the outlines of a new non- reductive form of naturalism and a more inclusive conception of nature than any provided (...) by the natural sciences. Our authors collectively believe that holding scientific naturalism up for philosophical scrutiny and challenging its misconceptions is of the first importance both for understanding ourselves and our place in the world; and, also, for the future direction of philosophy itself. (shrink)

In this paper the problem of free will is examined.

In this chapter, we will offer a sketch of the state of the art as concerns existing accounts of virtue acquisition in relation to automaticity. In particular, we will focus on the so-called “skill model,” which we aim to improve by questioning its rather common underlying dualistic picture of the mind. Then we will propose an account of skillful emotions by identifying the features that make them both automatic and embedded in an intelligent practice. Finally, we will show how this (...) view can help the skill model by offering a better description of emotion shaping in virtue acquisition. By doing so, we will contend that emotions contribute autonomously and actively to the skillfulness of the habits in which they are embedded. (shrink)

The most common taxonomy of free will theories of free will hinges on the distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism, which respectively assert and deny the compatibility of free will with causal determinism. This is a useful distinction, but it does not throw light on a fundamental aspect of the debate, regarding how the different views conceive of the role that philosophy and science should play in tackling with the free will issue. In this perspective, another taxonomy will be presented and (...) three families of theories will be distinguished: scientific isolationism, interactionism, and philosophical isolationism. In conclusion, it will be argued that interactionism is the right approach. (shrink)

_:_ This metacomment on Dennett’s comment on Sam Harris’s book on free will examines two issues. First, how one should conceive of the relationship between philosophy and science, in particular considering the dismissive attitude many highly regarded scientists show towards philosophy today. Second, a critical assessment of Harris’s replies to Dennett’s criticisms. _Keywords:_ Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris; Free Will; Science; Philosophy _In difesa dei vincoli avuncolari. Dennett e Harris sul rapporto tra filosofia e scienza_ _Riassunto:_ Questo metacommento sulle osservazioni avanzate (...) da Dennett sul libro di Sam Harris sul libero arbitrio verte su due questioni. In primo luogo, discute come si dovrebbe concepire il rapporto tra filosofia e scienza, in particolar modo considerando l’atteggiamento sprezzante mostrato oggi nei confronti della filosofia da diversi scienziati molto in vista. In secondo luogo saranno oggetto di valutazione critica le risposte di Harris alle critiche di Dennett. _Parole chiave: _Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris; Libero arbitrio; Scienza; Filosofia. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, a complete explanatory reduction of all aspects of the human mind to the electro-chemical functioning of the brain is at hand and will certainly produce vast and positive cultural, political and social consequences. However, notwithstanding the astonishing advances generated by the neurosciences in recent years for our understanding of the mechanisms and functions of the brain, the application of these findings to the specific but crucial issue of human agency can be considered a “pre-paradigmatic science” (...) (in Thomas Kuhn’s sense). This implies that the situation is, at the same time, intellectually stimulating and methodologically confused. More specifically—because of the lack of a solid, unitary and coherent methodological framework as to how to connect neurophysiology and agency—it frequently happens that tentative approaches, bold but very preliminary claims and even clearly flawed interpretations of experimental data are taken for granted. In this article some examples of such conceptual confusions and intellectual hubris will be presented, which derive from the most recent literature at the intersection between neurosciences, on the one hand, and philosophy, politics and social sciences, on the other hand. It will also be argued that, in some of these cases, hasty and over-ambitious conclusions may produce negative social and political consequences. The general upshot will be that very much has still to be clarified as to what and how neurosciences can tell us about human agency and that, in the meantime, intellectual and methodological caution is to be recommended. (shrink)

In Interpretations and Causes, some of the leading contemporary analytic philosophers discuss Davidson's new ideas in a lively, relevant, useful, and not always ...

The study of responsibility in ethics focuses on the nature of agency, accountability, blame, punishment and, crucially, the distribution of responsibility for complex ethical problems. Work in social ontology examines the nature of entities such as groups, organizations, corporations, and institutions, and what it is for these entities to have intentional states and to act. Until recently, these fields of research have mostly been treated separately. The goal of this issue is to examine emerging research at their intersection. The papers (...) gathered here explore both normative dimensions of work in social ontology and metaphysical assumptions and implications of ethical theorizing about collective responsibility. (shrink)

What aesthetic interest do we have in watching films? In a much debated paper, Roger Scruton argued that this interest typically comes down to the interest in the dramatic representations recorded by such films. Berys Gaut and Catharine Abell criticized Scruton’s argument by claiming that films can elicit an aesthetic interest also by virtue of their pictorial representation. In this article, we develop a different criticism of Scruton’s argument. In our view, a film can elicit an aesthetic interest that does (...) not come down to an interest in the dramatic representation or in the pictorial representation. We will argue that this is a distinctively cinematic interest. In section I we outline Scruton’s argument. In section II we point out an interest in how the cinematic medium presents the portrayed subject as detached from the spectator’s environment. In section III, by referring to Wittgenstein’s account of the contemplation from outside, we contend that the interest in films introduced in section II can count as an aesthetic interest. In section IV we argue that both documentaries and fiction films can elicit this kind of interest. In section V we compare the three different kinds of aesthetic interest that, in our view, a film can elicit. In section VI we describe the corresponding kinds of cinematic achievements. (shrink)

In her recent volume Habitual Ethics?,1 Sylvie Delacroix writes that habits are the ‘black holes of social sciences’. These phenomena are not studied enough, she argues, and (for the little they ar...